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Abstract
Do we have too few children? We intend to address this question. In devel-
oped countries, the fertility rate has declined since WWII. This may cause
a slowdown in the growth of GDP in developed countries. However, impor-
tant factors for the well-being of individuals are per capita variables, like per
capita growth and per capita consumption. In turn, the rate of technological
progress determines the growth rates of per capita variables. If the popu-
lation size is increasing, the labour inputs for R&D activity increase, and
thus speed up technological progress. As individuals do not take account
of this positive effect when deciding the number of their own children, the
number of children may become smaller than the socially optimal number of
children. However, an increase in the number of children reduces the assets
any one child owns: that is, there is a capital dilution effect. This works in
the opposite direction. We examine this issue using an endogenous growth
model where the head of a dynastic family decides the number of children.
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1 Introduction
Do we have too few children? We intend to address this question in this paper.
Developed countries experienced a decline in the fertility rate after WWII. Conse-
quently, the population size of developed countries will decrease dramatically. As
is well known from standard growth theory, the natural rate of growth determines
the growth rate of GDP: that is, the sum of the rate of technological progress and
the rate of population growth. Therefore, it is often argued that the decline in pop-
ulation size due to the decrease in the fertility rate necessarily reduces the growth
rate of GDP and potentially the level of welfare.1 Some economists insist that an
increase in the rate of technological progress—another factor that determines the
growth rate of GDP—will counter the decline in the fertility rate, especially as
policies are required to promote technological growth.
This dual argument at first appears convincing. However, it does not consider
economic reasoning. First, the important variables for welfare are not GDP itself,
but rather per capita variables like GDP per capita or consumption per capita. In
fact, standard growth theory predicts that a decline in the population growth rate
leads to an increase in per capita variables like these, and therefore the growth rate
of per capita variables is determined by the rate of technological progress.2
Second, we need to consider the endogenous mechanisms affecting the deter-
mination of economic growth. The dualism maintains that if a government could
increase the rate of technological progress, this would overcome the decline in the
fertility rate, that is, the decrease in population growth. However, how should the
government promote technological progress? Standard growth theory (that is, the
Solow model), cannot answer this question because the technological progress is
brought into the economy as manna from heaven. Therefore, we must resort to
endogenous growth models to respond. In these models, the rate of technology
progress is endogenously determined. The essential problem then becomes, when
the population size is decreasing, can the government raise the rate of techno-
logical progress? Importantly, to boost technological progress there is a need for
1The Japanese government recently appointed a minister of state for special missions to address
the declining fertility rate and undertake countermeasures.
2See any standard textbook; for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
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many researchers. A decrease in the population size may then reduce the number
of researchers working in research laboratories, and thus may lower the rate of
technological progress.
To investigate this issue, we employ the model in Jones (1995). In this model,
population growth invokes technological progress. Therefore, we can show that
the decline in population growth decreases the rate of technological progress and
thus decreases the growth rates of GDP and consumption per capita. Conse-
quently, it is questionable whether the government can increase the rate of tech-
nological progress when the rate of population growth is in decline. If this is the
case, should the government increase the rate of population growth to increase the
rate of technological progress?
However, the Jones (1995) model does not directly indicate that the govern-
ment should raise the rate of population growth. First, the purpose of economic
policy is not to promote economic growth, but rather to increase the welfare level
of individuals. Therefore, we first consider how individuals derive their utility.
Individuals derive utility not only from the consumption of final goods, but also
from having children. An increase in the number of children naturally raises their
level of welfare. However, while children are a source of enjoyment for their
parents, raising children invokes pecuniary costs along with opportunity costs be-
cause their parents usually stop working or reduce their working time to rear them.
By taking account of these costs and the utility from having children, individuals
make a decision on how many children they have.
Although this is a completely private decision, should the government inter-
vene in this largely private decision? The answer is that if market failure exists,
it is rational for a government to intervene in the decision-making process using
taxes or subsidies. The question is whether there is any market failure in the deci-
sions made by individuals on the number of children they will have. Consider now
that researchers and engineers in private firms conduct research and development
(R&D) activities. When parents decide upon the number of children, they do not
take into account the positive effects of population size on these R&D activities
in private firms. Consequently, because of this positive externality, the resource
allocation of the market equilibrium may differ from the socially optimal alloca-
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tion. That is, the number of children in the market equilibrium is smaller than in
the socially optimal allocation. Thus, some scope may exist for government in-
tervention by granting households a subsidy for having children. Nevertheless, it
is not obvious whether the government should provide the subsidy to households
that want to have more children, for there exists yet another cost for households to
have a child: namely, if a household decides to have one more child, the amount
of household capital that child owns becomes smaller. This reduces the capital
income for each child. This is the capital dilution effect. Therefore, there is a
need for further analysis based on the Jones (1995) model.
Jones (2003) has already examined some of these issues by modeling the
household’s decision on the number of children in Jones (1995). In fact, Jones
(2003) also argues that the number of children in the market equilibrium is smaller
than in the socially optimal allocation. However, Jones (2003) does not take into
account those R&D activities that target profit. We incorporate profit-maximizing
firms conducting R&D activities in our model. In particular, this modification can
easily overturn Jones’s (2003) result. Moreover, Jones’s (2003) analysis is limited
to steady state analysis. In contrast, the present analysis extends Jones (1995) by
examining the transition paths to the steady state.3 Because it takes a fairly long
time until the economy approaches the steady state, it is also important to exam-
ine the character of the transition paths. 4 We construct a dynamic system for the
model and conduct numerical simulations based on some plausible parameters.
We show that the number of children in the market equilibrium can become larger
than in the socially optimal allocation not only at the steady state, but also on the
transition paths.5 This implies that the government should not intervene in the
decisions of families by giving them subsidies to increase the number of children.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 constructs the dynamic system of the model. Section 4 derives the
socially optimal allocation. By conducting a numerical simulation, we compare
3Jones (1995) also only examines the character of the steady state. Arnold (2006) examines
the dynamics of Jones’s (1995) growth model.
4See, for example, Steger (2003).
5Jones (2003) also suggests this result for the steady state. However, he does not conduct a
formal analysis.
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the number of children in the market equilibrium with that in the socially optimal
allocation. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we set up a model based on Jones (2003). A representative dy-
nastic family populates the economy. Jones assumes that the government collects
lump sum taxes from households and uses them to pay wages for researchers. In
contrast to Jones (2003), we incorporate profit-maximizing private firms under-
taking R&D activity. Consequently, there are three sectors: a final goods sector,
an intermediate goods sector, and an R&D sector. First, we consider the final
goods sector.
2.1 Final Goods Sector
The final good, Yt, is produced by the following production function:
Yt = L1−αY,t
∫ At
0
xαj,td j, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where LY,t and x j,t respectively, represent labour input and the input of the jth
intermediate good at time t. At stands for the variety of intermediate goods at
time t. If the R&D firms succeed in inventing a new variety, At increases. Perfect
competition is supposed to prevail in the final goods market. Therefore, we obtain
the following profit-maximization conditions:
(1 − α) Yt
LY,t
= wt, (2)
αL1−αY,t x
α
j,t = p j,t, (3)
where wt and p j,t are the wage rate and the price of intermediate good j at time t,
respectively. We normalize the price of final goods to one. From (3), we obtain
the following demand function for intermediate good j:
x j,t = α
1
1−α
LY,t
p1/(1−α)j,t
. (4)
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2.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
A single firm produces each intermediate good. This firm is a monopoly and can
set the price of the intermediate good that it supplies. The monopoly is protected
by perfect patent protection. One unit of capital supplied by the family produces
one unit of the intermediate good. Therefore, the producer of the jth intermediate
good maximizes profit according to the following:
pi j = p jx j − rx j,
subject to the demand function of the final good sector, (4), where r is the rental
rate of capital. This results in the following pricing rule:
p ≡ p j = 1
α
r.
Hence, the price is the same for all intermediate goods j. Thus, the output levels
of all intermediate goods j are the same and given by:
x ≡ x j =
(
α2
r
) 1
1−α
LY . (5)
The profit of each intermediate good firm is given by:
pix ≡ pi j = (1 − α)
(
α1+α
rα
) 1
1−α
LY . (6)
2.3 R&D Sector
R&D activities are carried out using labour inputs according to the following tech-
nology:
˙At = δ˜LA,t. (7)
where LA,t is the labour input for R&D activities at time t. δ˜ represents the produc-
tivity level of R&D activities.6 ˙At measures new intermediate goods. We assume
that the accumulated knowledge positively affects productivity in the following
manner:
δ˜ = δAφt , δ > 0, 0 < φ < 1, (8)
6If we incorporate the duplication effect into the innovation technology, the production function
becomes ˙At = δ˜(LA,t)λ, 0 < λ ≤ 1. We neglect this effect for analytical simplicity.
6
where φ represents a parameter that expresses the extent of knowledge spillover.
φ < 1 means there are decreasing returns in the production of new intermediate
goods. Perfect competition prevails in R&D races. Each R&D firm maximizes
its profit without considering this spillover effect. Therefore, the objective of the
firm becomes:
piA,t = PA,t ˙At − wtLA,t,
where PA,t is the price of a blueprint of a newly invented intermediate good. Free
entry into the R&D race leads to the following zero-profit condition:
PA,t˜δ = wt.
By using (8), we obtain:
PA,tδAφt = wt. (9)
The discounted sum of profit of the intermediate good firm buying the blueprint
determines the price of the blueprint. That is, the following holds:
PA,t =
∫ ∞
τ=t
pix,τe
− ∫ τ
u=t rududτ, (10)
where ru represents the return on assets at time u. By differentiating (10) with
respect to time t, we obtain the following no-arbitrage condition:
rtPA,t = pix,t + ˙PA,t.
2.4 Dynastic Family
Individuals derive their utility not only from their own consumption but also from
the utility of their children.7 Thus, parents care about the number of their children,
not just their own utility. We assume that the head of a representative dynastic
family maximizes the following:
Ut =
∫ ∞
τ=t
u(cτ,Nτ)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ, (11)
where cτ is the consumption of a member of the dynasty at time τ, ρ(> 0) is the
rate of time preference, and Nτ is the number of members of the dynasty at time
7See Barro and Becker (1989) for this approach.
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τ. We further assume that the instantaneous utility function of the head takes the
following form for analytical simplicity:8
u(cτ,Nτ) = log cτ + θ log Nτ, (12)
where θ(> 0) is the weight placed on the utility of the offspring.
We next formulate the budget constraint of the dynasty. Let nt denote the num-
ber of children at time t for a member of the family. We assume that each member
has one unit of time endowment and that rearing children requires time: that is,
when rearing nt children, an individual member of the family must devote β(nt)
units of time and he/she must give up the corresponding wage income. The rearing
cost function, β(nt) satisfies the following conditions; β′(nt) > 0 and β′′(nt) > 0.
Thus, the per capita stock of assets evolves according to the following equation:
a˙t = (rt − nt)at + wt[1 − β(nt)] − ct. (13)
Because there are Nt identical individuals and each individual has nt children,
the size of the family evolves according to the following equation:
˙Nt = ntNt. (14)
The head of the family maximizes (11) subject to (13) and (14). The first-order
conditions are given by:
1
ct
= λt, (15)
µtNt = λt[at + wtβ′(nt)], (16)
˙λt = (ρ + nt − rt)λt, (17)
µ˙t = (ρ − nt)µt − θNt , (18)
where λt and µt are costate variables associated with asset holding and the family
size, respectively. Furthermore, the following transversality conditions must be
satisfied: lim
t→∞λtate
−ρt = 0 and lim
t→∞µtNte
−ρt = 0. The left-hand side of (16) rep-
resents the shadow value of children in the family. The right-hand side of (16)
represents the cost to have children. The first and second terms of (16) represent
the capital dilution effect and the opportunity cost, respectively.
8See the appendix for the rationale underlying this functional form.
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3 Market Equilibrium and Dynamics
Based on the model in the preceding section, we derive the market equilibrium
and construct a dynamic system. The goods market equilibrium is given by:
Yt = Ct + ˙Kt, (19)
where Ct and Kt are aggregate consumption and capital stock, respectively. Denot-
ing the per capita variables in lowercase, we can transform (19) into the following
per capita terms:
˙kt = yt − ct − ntkt. (20)
The equilibrium condition for capital is given by:
Kt = Atxt. (21)
We note here that there exist At varieties of intermediate goods at time t and the
quantity x j,t is the same for all intermediate goods. The market equilibrium con-
dition of the labour market is given by:
LY,t + LA,t =
[
1 − β(nt)] Nt. (22)
To derive the dynamic system of the economy, let us define the following
variables: χt ≡ ct/kt, zt ≡ At/kt, ζt ≡ µtNt, νt ≡ A1−φt /Nt, P˜A,t ≡ PA,t/Nt, and
gA,t ≡ ˙At/At. In the appendix, we show that the following five equations constitute
the dynamic system of the economy:
χ˙t =
{
χt +
(
1 − 1
α2
)
rt − ρ
}
χt, (23)
z˙t =
(
χt + nt + gA,t − rt
α2
)
zt, (24)
˙ζt = ρζt − θ, (25)
ν˙t =
[(1 − φ)gA,t − nt] νt, (26)
˙P˜A,t =
rt − 1 − α
α
rt
ztP˜A,t
− nt
 P˜A,t. (27)
The appendix also shows that rt, nt, and gA,t are given by the solutions of the
following three equations:
δ
P˜A,t
νt
= (1 − α)
(
α2
rt
) α
1−α
, (28)
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1
zt
(
α2
r
) 1
1−α
+
1
δ
νtgA,t = 1 − β(nt), (29)
β′(nt) = 1(1 − α)α 2α1−α
ζtχt − 1
zt
r
1
1−α
t . (30)
We now derive the balanced growth path (hereafter BGP). Section 5 examines
the full dynamics. In this section, we characterize the BGP. The BGP, {χ∗, z∗, P˜∗A,
r∗, ν∗, ζ :, g∗A, n
∗} is determined by the following equations:
χ∗ = ρ −
(
1 − 1
α2
)
r∗, (31)
χ∗ =
r∗
α2
− n∗ − g∗A, (32)
ζ∗ =
θ
ρ
, (33)
g∗A =
n∗
1 − φ, (34)
n∗ = r∗
1 − 1 − αα 1z∗P˜∗A
 , (35)
and the three equations, (28), (29), and (30). From (31), (32), and (34), the fol-
lowing holds:
r∗ = ρ +
2 − φ
1 − φn
∗. (36)
Then, substituting (36) into (31), we obtain:
χ∗ =
ρ
α2
+
(
1
α2
− 1
)
2 − φ
1 − φn
∗. (37)
When θ = 1, we obtain a clear result for the decision of the dynastic family. By
using (29) and (30), we obtain the following equation:
β′(n∗)
1 − β(n∗) − 1
δ
ν∗g∗A
=
α2
1 − α
ζ∗χ∗ − 1
r∗
.
Due to (37) and (A8), we can rearrange this into the following:
β′(n∗)
1 − β(n∗) − l∗A
=
1 + α
ρ
. (38)
If the allocation of labour input to the R&D sector is determined, (38) gives the
steady state number of children in the market equilibrium.
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4 Socially Optimal Allocation
By solving the social planner’s problem, we can derive the socially optimal allo-
cation, especially the optimal number of children. The social planner maximizes
the following welfare level of the dynastic family:
Ut =
∫ ∞
τ=t
[
log cτ + θ log Nτ
]
e−ρ(τ−t)dτ,
subject to the resource constraint and the production function of new varieties:
˙kt = kαt
[
At
{
1 − β(nt) − lA,t}]1−α − ct − ntkt, (39)
˙At = δAφt LA,t = δA
φ
t lA,tNt, (40)
and (14). The head of the dynastic family does not take account of (40) when
he/she optimizes. This is the source of the externality.
The first-order conditions of this maximization problem are given by:
1
ct
= λt, (41)
µ1,tNt = λt
[
(1 − α) ytβ
′(nt)
1 − β(nt) − lA,t + kt
]
, (42)
µ2,tδAφt Nt = λt(1 − α)
yt
1 − β(nt) − lA,t , (43)
˙λt =
(
ρ + nt − αytkt
)
λt, (44)
µ˙1,t = (ρ − nt)µ1,t − θNt − µ2,tδA
φ
t lA,t, (45)
µ˙2,t = ρµ2,t − λt (1 − α)ytAt − µ2,tφδA
φ−1
t lA,tNt, (46)
where λt, µ1,t, and µ2,t are costate variables associated with capital, family size,
and the varieties of intermediate goods, respectively. Furthermore, the following
transversality conditions must be satisfied: limt→∞ λtate−ρt = 0, limt→∞ µ1,tNte−ρt =
0, and limt→∞ µ2,tAte−ρt = 0.
From (41) and (44), we obtain:
c˙t =
[
α(ztlY,t)1−α − ρ − nt
]
ct. (47)
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From (39) and (47), we obtain:
χ˙t =
{
χt − (1 − α) (ztlY,t)1−α − ρ
}
χt. (48)
Due to the definition of zt and (39), we obtain the following dynamics for zt:
z˙t =
[
χt + nt + gA,t − (ztlY,t)1−α
]
zt. (49)
We here define ζt ≡ µ1,tNt and ψt ≡ µ2,tAt. Then, from (45), we obtain:
˙ζt = ρζt − θ − ψtgA,t. (50)
From (46), we obtain:
˙ψt =
{(1 − φ)gA,t + ρ}ψt − (1 − α) (ztlY,t)1−α
χt
. (51)
From (43), we obtain the following relationship:
(1 − α)(ztlY,t)1−α[
1 − β(nt) − lA,t] χt = δψtνt . (52)
Note that we have used the following definition of νt: νt ≡ A1−φt /Nt. As for the
dynamics of νt, we can obtain the same equation as (26). From (41) and (42), we
obtain:
ζt =
1
ct
[
(1 − α) ytβ
′(nt)
1 − β(nt) − lA,t + kt
]
.
By using the definition of χt and zt, we can rearrange this relationship as follows:
ζtχt − 1 = (1 − α) zt
1−αβ′(nt)
[1 − β(nt) − lA,t]α . (53)
Noting that (A8) and lY,t = 1 − β(nt) − lA,t, (48), (49), (50), (51), and (26), to-
gether with (52) and (53), constitute the dynamic system of the socially optimal
allocation.
We next derive the BGP of the socially optimal allocation. From (48), (49),
(50), (51), and (26), the BGP of the social optimal, {χOP, zOP, ψOP, νOP, ζOP, gOPA ,
nOP}, is determined by the following: equations:
χOP = (1 − α) (zOPlOPY )1−α + ρ, (54)
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χOP = (zOPlOPY )1−α − nOP − gOPA , (55)
ρζOP = θ + ψOPgOPA , (56){
(1 − φ)gOPA + ρ
}
χOPψOP = (1 − α)(zOPlOPY )1−α, (57)
gOPA =
nOP
1 − φ, (58)
and the relationship, lOPY = 1 − β(nOP) − 1δνOPgOPA and the two equations; (52) and
(53).
When θ = 1, we can obtain a clear result similar to (38) for the market equi-
librium:
β′(nOP)
1 − β(nOP) =
1
ρ
. (59)
In order to compare the socially optimal number of children at the steady state
with the number of children in the market equilibrium at the steady state, it is
useful to rewrite (38) using the share of researchers allocated to R&D activities.
This share is defined by lA ≡ sA[1 − β(n)]. Then, (38) is transformed into the
following form:
β′(n∗)
1 − β(n∗) =
(1 − s∗A)(1 + α)
ρ
.
Because β′(n)/[1− β(n)] is an increasing function of n, if the following inequality
holds, (1− s∗A)(1+α) > 1, then the number of children in the market equilibrium at
the steady state is larger than the socially optimal number of children at the steady
state. That is, too many children exist in the market equilibrium at the steady state.
However, because the share of researchers is an endogenous variable, we conduct
a simulation approach to obtain a much clearer result. Moreover, we calibrate the
transition paths based on some plausible parameters in the following section.
5 Simulation of Transition Paths
To analyse the model numerically, we specify the function β(·) as:
β(n) = βn2, (60)
where β is a positive constant.
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As a benchmark, we choose the parameter values as follows. The time prefer-
ence rate, ρ, is set to 0.05, which is a conventional value in the growth literature.
The weight on the utility of offspring, θ, is equal to 1, because we analyse the
case where θ = 1 holds in Section 4. We assume that α is equal to 1/1.25, which
implies that the mark-up of the intermediate goods sector is 1.25. The values of β
and δ are chosen so that the population growth rate of the market equilibrium at
BGP becomes sufficiently close to 0.01. Then, we obtain β = 1300 and δ = 0.3.
Finally, φ is set to 0.5 so that the annual growth rate of the economy, g∗A, is around
0.02.
Under this parameter set, the population growth rate of the market equilibrium
is equal to 0.0099, which is larger than that of the socially optimal allocation,
nop = 0.0077. In this benchmark case, the number of children in the market equi-
librium at the steady state is larger than the socially optimal number of children
at the BGP. That is, there are too many children in the market equilibrium at the
steady state. Because the growth rates are given by (34) and (58), it is expected
that in our numerical example, g∗A is larger than g
op
A . As expected, g∗A is 0.197
and larger than gopA = 0.0147. The market equilibrium attains a higher growth
rate than the socially optimal growth rate. The share of labour allocated to R&D
activities in market equilibrium s∗A = 0.185 is smaller than the socially optimal
share sopA = 0.201 and satisfies the condition (1 − s∗A)(1 + α) > 1.
The next question is whether the number of children in the market equilibrium
is larger than the socially optimal number of children along all the transition paths
to the BGP. For this purpose, we analyse the transition paths by using the relax-
ation algorithm.9 In the following numerical examples, the initial values of the
state variables are chosen as z(≡ At/kt) = 0.015 and ν(≡ At1−φ/Nt) = 2.9 so that
in the benchmark market equilibrium, the population growth rate decreases over
time and the share of labour allocated to R&D activities increases over time.
Figure 1 presents the results for the benchmark case. The upper panel shows
the transitional paths of the number of children (the population growth rate). The
9Trimborn et al. (2008) detail the relaxation algorithm. They also provide Mat-
Lab programs for the relaxation algorithm, freely downloadable at http://www.rrz.uni-
hamburg.de/IWK/trimborn/relaxation.htm.
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solid line stands for the number of children in the market equilibrium while the
dotted line stands for the socially optimal number of children. The panel shows
that along all transition paths to the BGP, the number of children in the market
equilibrium is larger than the socially optimal number of children in this bench-
mark economy.
The middle and lower panels of Figure 1 depict the transitional paths of gA
and sA, respectively. From the lower panel, we know that the labour share allo-
cated to R&D activities in the market equilibrium increases over time along the
transition path whereas it decreases over time in the socially optimal allocation.
The share of labour allocated to R$D activities is also smaller than the socially
optimal share along the transition path. The growth rate of the market equilibrium
is smaller than the socially optimal growth rate during the early stage of transition
due to the smaller share of labour allocated to R&D activities in the market equi-
librium. During the later stages of transition and at the BGP, however, the growth
rate of the market equilibrium becomes higher than the socially optimal rate. This
is because the differences between the shares of labour allocated to R&D activi-
ties of the market equilibrium and that of the social optimum decrease over time
along the transition path, and because the higher population growth of the market
equilibrium positively affects the growth rate.
In Figures 2–4, we present numerical examples other than the benchmark case.
Figure 2 shows where the value of ρ is increased and decreased from the bench-
mark level. Figures 3 and 4 show where the values of φ and θ are increased and
decreased from the benchmark levels. All figures show that not only at the BGP
but also along the transition path to the BGP, the number of children in the market
equilibrium is larger than the socially optimal number of children. In all of the
figures, the growth rate and the share of labour allocated to R&D activities exhibit
similar transitional paths. The only exception is when the value of ρ is increased
from the benchmark. When ρ is 0.07, the share of labour allocated to R&D activ-
ities in the market equilibrium becomes higher than that of the social optimum in
the later stage of transition (the lower left panel of Figure 2). However, even in
this exceptional case, the number of children in the market equilibrium is larger
than the socially optimal number of children along the transition path.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we incorporated profit-maximizing innovating firms and thus ex-
tended the model in Jones (2003). Importantly, the present model is much more re-
alistic than Jones (2003), where the labour allocation is fixed. Moreover, we have
examined transition paths by conducting simulation analysis. We have shown that
the number of children in the market equilibrium is larger than in the socially op-
timal allocation. Based on plausible parameters, this is not only at the steady state
but also on the transition paths.
The usual argument is that because the number of children that parents actu-
ally have is smaller than the number of children they want to have, the government
must subsidize parents so they can have more children. However, our result im-
plies that the government should be cautious with policy when intervening in the
private decisions of parents with respect to the number of children.
Finally, we provide some directions for future research. First, in the present
model, we assume that the number of children take real numbers. However, in
reality the number of children must be nonnegative integers. Therefore, there may
be a substantial difference between having two children and having three children.
If so, we must investigate this issue by taking into account the integer problem.
Second, a continuous decrease in the population leads to zero population size.
Given at least some population size must exist for economic activities and human
life, we must consider the possibility of an optimal population size. These are
important issues to be considered in future research.
Appendix
A1
In this appendix, we show how the objective function (11) and the instantaneous
utility function (12) are derived. Consumption at time t by a member of the dy-
nastic family is given by ct. Because a member has nt children, the utility of this
member, Ut is defined as:
Ut = u(ct) · dt + (1 − ρdt)Υ(ntdt) · (ntdt)Ut+dt, (A1)
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where Υ(ntdt) is the degree of altruism of parents toward their children. For sim-
plicity, we assume the following functional forms: u(ct) = ct1−σ1−σ and Υ(ntdt) =
(ntdt)−ε.
We assume that the size of the dynastic family at time t is one, that is, Nt = 1.
Then, we have Nt+dt = ntdt, Nt+2dt = ntdt × nt+dtdt, and so on. Therefore, by using
(A1), we can obtain the following discounted sum of Ut:
Ut = u(ct) ·dt+(1−ρdt)u(ct+dt)(Nt+dt)1−ε ·dt+(1−ρdt)2u(ct+2dt)(Nt+2dt)1−ε ·dt+ · · · · .
(A2)
Because of the assumption of the functional form, we have:
u(c)N1−ε =
(
cN 1−ε1−σ
)1−σ − 1
1 − σ .
As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p410), we add the term -1 in the numerator
so that we obatin the log-utility form as σ approaches 1. When σ approaches 1
by keeping the ratio (1 − ε)/(1 − σ) constant, then its limit becomes:
lim
σ→1
(
cN 1−ε1−σ
)1−σ − 1
1 − σ = ln c + θ ln N, (A3)
where θ ≡ (1 − ε)/(1 − σ). Consequently, (A2) can be rewritten as follows:
Ut = [ln ct+θ ln Nt]dt+(1−ρdt){[ln ct+dt+θ ln Nt+dt]dt+(1−ρdt)[ln ct+2dt+θ ln Nt+2dt]dt+···}.
Neglecting the higher-order terms of (dt)n (n > 1), (A1) finally becomes:
Ut = [ln c + θ ln N] · dt + (1 − ρdt)Ut+dt.
Dividing both sides of this equation and taking the limit of dt → 0, we obtain the
following differential equation:
·
Ut = ρUt − (ln ct + θ ln Nt).
By integrating this differential equation, we can obtain the desired result.
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A2
In this appendix, we derive the dynamic system of the economy. Noting that the
same amount of the intermediate goods is produced, we can transform (1) into the
following production function in intensive form:
yt = kαt (AtlY)1−α, (A4)
where lY ≡ LY/N. Thus, (20) becomes:
˙kt = kαt (AtlY)1−α − ct − ntkt. (A5)
From (15) and (17), we obtain:
c˙t = (rt − ρ − nt)ct. (A6)
By using (5) and (21), and defining zt ≡ At/kt, we obtain:
ztlY,t =
(
α2/r
) 1
1−α
. (A7)
By defining χt ≡ ct/kt and using (A7), we obtain (23). We next derive the
dynamics of zt, (24). By defining ζt ≡ µtNt, we obtain (25). By similarly defining
νt ≡ A1−φt /Nt, we obtain (26). Again, by defining P˜A,t ≡ PA,t/Nt and using (6) and
(A7), we obtain (27).
By using (2), (9), and (A7), we obtain (28).
From the definition of νt, (7), and (8), we obtain:
LA,t/Nt ≡ lA,t = 1
δ
νtgA,t. (A8)
Substituting (A7) and (A8) into (22), we obtain (29).
From (15) and (16), we obtain:
ζt =
kt + wtβ′(nt)
ct
. (A9)
By using (2), and (A4), we obtain (1−α)
(
kt
AtlY,t
)α
= wtAt . Substituting this into (A9),
using (A7), and rearranging, we obtain (30).
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A3
In this appendix, we derive the equation that determines the socially optimal num-
ber of children at the steady state, (59).
From (54), (55), we obtain:
(1 − α) (zOPlOPY )1−α + ρ = (zOPlOPY )1−α − nOP − gOPA .
By using (58), this relationship can be rearranged as follows:
α(zOPlOPY )1−α = ρ +
2 − φ
1 − φn
OP. (A10)
Next, substituting (A10) into (55) and using (58), we obtain:
χOP =
1
α
[
ρ + (1 − α)2 − φ
1 − φn
OP
]
. (A11)
From (57), (A10), and (A11), we obtain:
ψOP =
(1 − α)
(
ρ + 2−φ1−φn
OP
)
(ρ + nOP)
[
ρ + (1 − α) 2−φ1−φnOP
] . (A12)
Substituting (A12) into (52) and noting that lY = 1 − β(n) − lA and (A11), we
obtain:
(zOP)1−α
(lOPY )α
=
δ
α
ρ + 2−φ1−φn
OP
(ρ + nOP)νOP . (A13)
By multiplying both sides of (A13) by lOPY and substituting(A10) into them, we
obtain:
νOP =
δ[1 − β(nOP)]
ρ + 2−φ1−φn
OP
. (A14)
From (53) and (56), we obtain:
(1 − α) (z
OP)1−α
(lOPY )α
β′(nOP) = ζOPχOP − 1 = θ
ρ
χOP − 1 + g
OP
A
ρ
ψOPχOP.
Substituting (58), (A11), and (A12) into this relationship, we obtain:
(1 − α) (z
OP)1−α
(lOPY )α
β′(nOP) = θ
ρα
[
θ − α
θ
ρ + (1 − α)2 − φ
1 − φn
OP
]
+
1 − α
αρ(1 − φ)
nOP
ρ + nOP
(
ρ +
2 − φ
1 − φn
OP
)
. (A15)
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When θ = 1, we can rearrange (A15) as follows:
(1 − α) (z
OP)1−α
(lOPY )α
β′(nOP) = 1
ρ
(
ρ +
2 − φ
1 − φn
OP
) (
1 +
1
1 − φ
nOP
ρ + nOP
)
.
Substituting (A13) into this and using (A14), we obtain (59).
20
References
Arnold, Lutz G. (2006) “The dynamics of the Jones R&D growth model,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 9, 143–152.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. (2004) “Economic Growth,” The MIT
Press, Cambridge.
Barro, Robert J. and Gary S. Becker (1989) “Fertility Choice in a Model of Eco-
nomic Growth,” Econometrica, 57, 481–501.
Jones, Charles I. (1995) “R&D-based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 759–784.
Jones, Charles I. (2003) “Population and Ideas: A Theory of Endogenous
Growth,” in Aghion, Frydman, Stiglitz, and Woodford (eds.) Knowledge, Infor-
mation, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S.
Phelps (Princeton University Press).
Steger, Thomas M. (2003) “The Segerstrom Model: Stability, Speed of Conver-
gence and Policy Implications,” Economic Bulletin, 15, 1–8.
Trimborn, Timo, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger. (2008) “Multidimen-
sional Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numerical Procedure,” Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics, 12, 301–319.
21
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
7
8
9
10
11
x?10 -3
t
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
t
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
t
sA
Figure 1. Benchmark Case
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(a) ρ = 0.07 (b) ρ = 0.03
Figure 2. Effects of Changes in ρ
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Figure 3. Effects of Changes in φ
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Figure 4. Effects of Changes in θ
25
